First Impressions
The following pages contain brief summaries, drafted by the Seton
Hall Circuit Review members, of issues of first impression identified by
a federal court of appeals opinion between September 1, 2005 and
January 31, 2006. This collection is organized by circuit.
Each summary presents an issue of first impression, a brief analysis
and the court’s conclusion. It is intended to give only the briefest
synopsis of the first impression issue, not a comprehensive analysis.
This compilation makes no claim to be exhaustive, but will hopefully
serve the reader well as a reference starting point.
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FEDERAL CIRCUIT
SKF USA Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 423 F.3d 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: Must “the distinction between domestic goods and gray
market goods . . . be physical in nature in order to satisfy the ‘material
difference test,’” thereby establishing a violation of trademark under §
337 of the Tariff Act of 1930? Id. at 1313.
ANALYSIS: Gray market goods “‘are defined as ‘genuine goods that
. . . are of foreign manufacture, bearing a legally affixed foreign
trademark that is the same mark as is registered in the United States; gray
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goods are legally acquired abroad and then imported without the consent
of the United States trademark holder.’” Id. at 1312 (quoting Gamut
Trading Co. v. Int’l Trade Co., 200 F.3d 775, 778 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).
Further, where there is a material difference between the goods of the
U.S. trademark holder and the gray market goods bearing the same mark,
there exists an infringement of the U.S. trademark. Id. at 1312-13. The
Federal Circuit explained that the material difference test is used because
gray market goods that lack certain characteristics associated with the
goods of the U.S. trademark holder but bearing the same mark may lead
consumers to believe that the goods “originated from the trademark
owner . . . [thereby] damag[ing] the owner’s goodwill.” Id. at 1312. The
court then noted that in prior cases on the subject, “material differences
were found based in part on differences in services and guarantees
between authorized and gray market goods, as well as accompanying
documents such as instruction manuals, nonphysical traits that were
nevertheless determined to constitute a material difference to
consumers.” Id. at 1314. The Federal Circuit thus found the proposition
that “nonphysical traits may constitute material differences [to be]
consistent with [Federal Circuit] case law and [as promoting] the sound,
established policies underlying trademark protection.” Id.
CONCLUSION: “[M]aterial differences need not be physical in order
to establish trademark infringement in gray market cases.” Id.
Saab Cars USA, Inc. v. United States, 434 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
QUESTION: What is “[t]he correct standard of review for a
judgment issued on stipulated facts in lieu of trial”? Id. at 1371.
ANALYSIS: The Federal Circuit stated that “in rendering judgment
based upon stipulated facts, the trial judge of necessity draws – and bases
legal conclusions on – factual inferences that would be impermissible in
the summary judgment context under Rule 56.” Id. at 1372. In addition,
“[a] trial court’s decision based upon stipulated facts resembles, in
significant respects, a decision on the administrative record, which we
have recently concluded is not akin to summary judgment.” Id.; see
Bannum, Inc. v. United States, 404 F.3d 1346, 1353-57 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
CONCLUSION: The court stated that it will “review the trial court’s
legal conclusions de novo.” Id. Further, the court will “review inferences
it drew from the stipulated facts, and its application of the law to those
facts, for clear error.” Id.
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IPXL Holdings, L.L.C. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 430 F.3d 1377 (Fed. Cir.
2005)
QUESTION: “Whether a single claim covering both an apparatus
and a method of use of that apparatus is invalid” in a patent infringement
suit. Id. at 1384.
ANALYSIS: “The Board of Patent Appeals . . . has made it clear that
reciting both an apparatus and a method of using that apparatus renders a
claim indefinite under section 112, paragraph 2.” Id. The court ruled that,
“such a claim ‘is not sufficiently precise to provide competitors with an
accurate determination of the ‘metes and bounds of protection involved’
and is ‘ambiguous and properly rejected’ under section 112, paragraph
2.” Id.
CONCLUSION: “Because [the claim] recites both a system and the
method for using that system, it does not apprise a person of ordinary
skill in the art of its scope, and it is invalid under section 112, paragraph
2.” Id. (quoting Ex Parte David L. Lyell, 17 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1548, 1550-51
(BPAI 1990).
FIRST CIRCUIT
United States v. Brito, 427 F.3d 53 (1st Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: “Under what circumstances should an excited utterance
made to a police officer be considered testimonial?” Id. at 55-56.
ANALYSIS: First, the court reviewed the Supreme Court’s decision
in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), noting that the Court
“decreed that, as to ‘testimonial’ statements, the Confrontation Clause
assures a procedural right to confrontation rather than a substantive
guarantee of evidentiary reliability.” Id. at 58. In that decision, the
Supreme Court provided several examples that would qualify as
“testimonial statements” and thus be inadmissible. One example the
Court discussed was “statements that were made under circumstances
which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the
statement would be available for use at a later trial.” Id. at 59. After
examining different ways to decide whether excited utterances can
constitute testimonial hearsay, the 1st Circuit rejected a categorical
approach that would either always permit or never allow excited
utterances, and instead chose to take “an ad hoc, case-by-case approach.”
Id. at 61. The circuit found that once a statement qualified as an excited
utterance, “the court then must look to the attendant circumstances and
assess the likelihood that a reasonable person would have either retained
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or regained the capacity to make a testimonial statement at the time of
the utterance.” Id. at 62.
CONCLUSION: While the circumstances will vary from case to case,
in “the circumstances at hand, the excited utterance was nontestimonial
and, therefore, properly admitted into evidence.” Id. at 56.
United States v. Martinez-Flores, 428 F.3d 22 (1st Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: Whether “the Congressional endorsement of downward
sentencing [under the Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children
Today Act (“Protect Act”), Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (2003)]
departures in conjunction with ‘fast-track’ case processing violate the
nondelegation doctrine?” Id. at 24.
ANALYSIS: Congress recently instructed the United States
Sentencing Commission to add § 401(m)(2)(B) to the Protect Act, giving
the Government authority to grant criminals prosecuted under the Act a
four-level downward sentencing departure in exchange for their guilty
pleas and waivers of rights to file motions and appeals. See id. at 26. This
provision gives the Attorney General discretion to decide the
circumstances under which he would authorize such a “fast-track”
program. Id. at 25-26. The appellant argued that this provision is
unconstitutional because it delegates too much legislative power to the
Attorney General. Id. at 26. The 1st Circuit reasoned that “Congress
created the Sentencing Commission and may constitutionally require the
Commission to set sentencing policy.” Id. at 28. The court added, “[t]he
fact that the new sentencing policy contains a condition that depends for
its fulfillment on actions of the Attorney General does not mean
Congress has delegated either Legislative or Judicial Branch power to the
Attorney General.” Id. The court noted that the Attorney General does
not have to act at all under this provision and that the authority given to
the Attorney General under this provision is “‘no broader than the
authority [prosecutors] routinely exercise in enforcing criminal laws.’”
Id. at 28-29 (alteration in original).
CONCLUSION: The 1st Circuit held that § 401(m)(2)(B) of the
Protect Act does not violate the nondelegation doctrine. Id. at 24.
In re PolyMedica Corp. Sec. Litig., 432 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: What is the “standard for determining whether a market
was ‘efficient’ when applying the fraud-on-the-market presumption of
investor reliance?” Id. at 1.
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ANALYSIS: In a securities fraud action under § 10(b) of the
Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5, reliance is a required element. Id. at 4.
One theory that may be used to prove reliance is the fraud-on-the-market
theory which permits “a rebuttable presumption that the plaintiff relied
on the ‘integrity of the market price’ which reflected that misstatement.”
Id. at 5. In order to use the fraud-on-the-market theory, an investor must
prove that the market is “efficient.” Id. The Supreme Court decision
adopting the fraud-on-the-market theory, Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224
(1988), did not adopt any particular economic theory to use for
determining if a market is efficient. Id. at 9.
Most other circuits have adopted “a definition of market efficiency
which requires that stock price fully reflect all publicly available
information.” Id. This definition is also consistent with a pre-Basic 1st
Circuit decision. Id. at 10 (citing Roeder v. Alpha Indus., Inc., 814 F.2d
22 (1st Cir. 1987)). Finally, the only alternative definition “allows some
information to be considered ‘material’ and yet not affect market price.”
Id.
CONCLUSION: “An efficient market is one in which the market
price of the stock fully reflects all publicly available information.” Id. at
14.
United States v. Rondeau, 430 F. 3d 44 (1st Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: Whether the Crawford rule, which generally precludes
use of testimonial hearsay, applies in supervised release revocation
proceedings. Id. at 47.
ANALYSIS: “Nothing in Crawford indicates that the Supreme Court
intended to extend the Confrontation Clause’s reach beyond the criminal
prosecution context.” Id. The 1st Circuit joins the 6th, 8th, and 9th
Circuits in concluding “a supervised release revocation hearing is not a
‘criminal prosecution,’” therefore, Crawford does not apply. Id. at 48.
CONCLUSION: The use of testimonial hearsay is permitted in a
supervised release revocation hearing. Id.
In re Antonio Rivera Torres, 432 F.3d 20 (1st Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: “[W]hether there is an explicit waiver of sovereign
immunity in 11 U.S.C. § 106, as to allow an award of emotional distress
damages against the United States, under the sanctions provisions of 11
U.S.C. § 105, to remedy a violation of 11 U.S.C. § 524, which enjoins
actions to recover discharged debts.” Id. at 23.
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ANALYSIS: The court began by noting that the standard for waiver
is stringent, and “[a] waiver must be unequivocally expressed and must
be strictly construed in favor of the sovereign with ambiguities construed
against waiver.” Id. at 23-24 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
The court then found that “[t]here is no doubt that § 106 is an express
waiver of sovereign immunity [but that] does not answer the question of
what types of relief are encompassed in the waiver.” Id. at 24 (emphasis
added). The 1st Circuit concluded that although the legislative history
shows a waiver for monetary damages, “Congress has not ‘definitely and
unequivocally’ waived sovereign immunity under § 106(a) of the
Bankruptcy Code for emotional damages awards in circumstances such
as these.” Id. at 31.
CONCLUSION: The 1st Circuit held that “sovereign immunity bars
awards for emotional distress damages against the federal government
under § 105(a) for any willful violation of § 524, and that immunity is
not waived by § 106.” Id.
Powell v. United States, 430 F.3d 490 (1st Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: Whether defendant’s conviction for eluding a police
officer qualifies as a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924, the Armed
Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”). Id. at 491.
ANALYSIS: The court analogized eluding a police officer to a prison
escape. Id. Regarding the latter, the 1st Circuit had recently characterized
a prison escape as similar to “a ‘powder keg,’ ready to explode into
violence.” Id. (quoting United States v. Winn, 364 F.3d 7, 11-12 (1st Cir.
2004). Furthermore, the court noted that a “consensus has emerged that
evasive driving offenses, like prison escapes, constitute a category of
‘violent crime’ within the meaning of the ACCA’s provision for ‘conduct
that presents a serious potential risk to another.’” Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(e)(2)(B)(ii)). Finally, the court reasoned that “high-speed car
chases pose a grave threat of death and injury by collision, as well as
escalated confrontations between suspects and police.” Id. at 492.
CONCLUSION: The court held that defendant’s conviction for
eluding police is a proper violent-crime predicate under the ACCA. Id.
In re William Smith, 436 F.3d 9 (1st Cir. 2006)
QUESTION: Whether the statute of limitations for “filing a habeas
petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 started to run when the Supreme Court
denied” a petition for certiorari or when the Supreme Court denied a
rehearing of that petition. Id. at 9-10.
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ANALYSIS: The petitioner, a federal inmate convicted of being a
felon in possession of a firearm sought an appeal of the district court’s
denial of his habeas petition. Id. at 10. The 1st Circuit determined that
“[a]lthough the statute itself does not define when a conviction becomes
final for this purpose, every circuit that has addressed the issue has
concluded that a conviction becomes final—and the one-year period
therefore starts to run—when a petition for certiorari is denied.” Id.
CONCLUSION: The 1st Circuit denied petitioner’s appeal and
concluded that the one-year statute of limitations runs when the Supreme
Court first denies certiorari. Id. at 11.
United States v. Pho, 433 F.3d 53 (1st Cir. 2006)
QUESTION: Whether “a federal district court, consistent with the
teachings of United States v. Booker [may] impose a sentence outside the
advisory guideline sentencing range based solely on its categorical
rejection of the guidelines’ disparate treatment of offenses involving
crack cocaine, on the one hand, and powdered cocaine, on the other
hand.” Id. at 54 (citation omitted).
ANALYSIS: In a consolidation of two appeals, the 1st Circuit found
that “the lower court jettisoned the guidelines and constructed a new
sentencing range by using a 20:1 crack-to-powder ratio in lieu of the
100:1 ratio embedded in both the statutory scheme and the guidelines.”
Id. at 62. Firmly articulating that “[m]atters of policy typically are for
Congress,” the appellate court described the “decision to employ a 100:1
crack-to-powder ratio rather than a 20:1 ratio, a 5:1 ratio, or a 1:1 ratio . .
. a policy judgment, pure and simple.” Id. (citing United States v.
Andrade, 94 F.3d 9, 14-15 (1st Cir. 1996)). The Sentencing Commission,
by congressional edict, “is allied with Congress in the important
endeavor of calibrating sentences for federal offenses” and “[n]othing in
Booker altered this distribution of authority over sentencing policy.” Id.
Thus, under Booker, “a district court may exercise discretion in
fashioning sentences – but that discretion was meant to operate only
within the ambit of the individualized factors spelled out in section
3553(a).” Id. (citing United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S. Ct.
738, 764-66 (2005)). As such, “the district court’s categorical rejection
of the 100:1 ratio impermissibly usurps Congress’s judgment about the
proper sentencing policy for cocaine offenses.” Id. at 63.
CONCLUSION: The 1st Circuit held that “the district court erred as a
matter of law when it constructed a new sentencing range based on the
categorical substitution of a 20:1 crack-to-powder ratio for the 100:1
ratio embedded in the sentencing guidelines. This holding recognize[d]
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that sentencing decisions must be done case by case and must be
grounded in case-specific considerations, not in general disagreement
with broad-based policies enunciated by Congress or the Commission, as
its agent.” Id. at 64-65.
SECOND CIRCUIT
M. Fortunoff of Westbury Corp. v. Peerless Ins. Co., 432 F.3d 127 (2d
Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: “Whether 49 U.S.C. § 13906(a)(3) (2000 & Supp.
2005), enacted as part of the Interstate Commerce Commission
Termination Act of 1995 (“ICCTA” or “Termination Act”), Pub. L. No.
104-88, 109 Stat. 803, to replace the Motor Carrier Act’s insurance
provisions, allowed the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration
(“FMCSA”) – the successor agency to the Interstate Commerce
Commission (“ICC”) in this area of regulation – to continue to
distinguish between types of motor carriage when requiring cargo
liability insurance.” Id. at 129.
ANALYSIS: “Prior to 1995 the Motor Carrier Act distinguished
between two different types of motor carriers: motor common carriers
and motor contract carriers.” Id. at 130 (citing 49 U.S.C. § 10102(15)(16) (1994)). The ICC issued separate regulations for each type,
including different insurance requirements. Id. at 130-31. Under the
ICCTA the distinction between the types of carriers was abolished,
however, pursuant to the “transition rule” in 49 U.S.C. § 13902(d)
(2000), the FMCSA “continued to register transportation providers as
‘common carriers’ and ‘contract carriers.’” Id. at 133. Congress had,
however, clearly intended to abolish separate categories for motor
carriers. Id. at 136. Congress left to the discretion of the Secretary of
Transportation the decision to require cargo liability insurance. Id. at
137. This incorporation of discretion allows the Secretary to require that
motor carriers have cargo insurance and to require that some carry
insurance while others do not. Id. at 138.
CONCLUSION: 49 U.S.C. § 13906(a)(3) “gives the FMCSA
‘discretion to require cargo liability insurance for some types of motor
carriage and not others, and that the agency’s discretion is entitled to
deference.” Id. at 130.
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Bus. and Residents Alliance of East Harlem v. Jackson, 430 F.3d 584
(2d Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: “Whether the [New York City Empowerment] Zone’s
subsequent use . . . of federal funds in connection with individual
projects triggers the historic preservation preview process, as set forth in
§ 106 of the National Historical Preservation Act, 16 U.S.C. § 407(f).”
Id. at 586.
ANALYSIS: Section 106 is triggered only when a federal agency has
jurisdiction or licensing authority over the project at issue. Id. In the case
of the Zone, all approval and funding decisions as to the East River Plaza
project are made at the state and local level. Id. Therefore, § 106 is not
triggered, and thus construction of the East River Plaza project can move
forward with construction without undergoing a historical preservation
review process. Id. at 594.
CONCLUSION: Section 106 is inapplicable here, thus, the historical
preservation review process is not triggered. Id.
In re Smart World Techs., L.L.C., 423 F.3d 166 (2d Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: Whether the bankruptcy court erred in granting
creditor-appellees standing to pursue settlement of an adversary
proceeding under FED. R. BANK. P. 9019 without the participation of,
and over objections of, the debtor-in-possession. Id. at 174-75.
ANALYSIS: The court looked at the plain language of the rule as
well as policy considerations and determined that the rule permits only
the debtor-in-possession to move for settlement. Id. at 175. However, the
court noted that certain limited circumstances allow settlement of a claim
over the objections of the debtor-in-possession, such as aggrieved
creditors or other parties dissatisfied with the conduct of a debtor-inpossession who appoints a trustee or examiner who then brings the
motion. Id. at 175-76. However, those circumstances were not present in
this case. Id. at 176. The court also held that only in rare circumstances
may the doctrine of derivative standing be appropriate in the rule 9019
context if unjustifiable behavior exists on the part of the debtor-inpossession, however, those circumstances also were not present in this
case. Id. at 177. Finally, the court held that the power granted under 11
U.S.C. § 105 does not provide the bankruptcy court with an independent
basis to grant standing. Id. at 184.
CONCLUSION: The court held that certain circumstances authorize
parties other than the debtors-in-possession to pursue a rule 9019 motion
in a bankruptcy proceeding, however, those circumstances were not
present in this case. Id. at 184.
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Guaylupo-Moya v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: Whether the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act (“IIRIRA”) retroactively restricts
deportation relief under section 212(h) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1952 (“INA”), codified as 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h), for
offenses committed by an alien prior to the statute’s enactment. Id at 129.
ANALYSIS: The court applied a line of case law relating to the
effect of IIRIRA and the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
(“AEDPA”) to a similar section of the INA which held that no
retroaction will apply unless there is clear language by Congress to the
contrary. Id. at 129. In the event that the language is ambiguous, courts
must determine whether applying the statute retroactively “would change
the legal consequences of past events;” in which case the courts would
find a presumption against retroactivity. Id. at 130. The court then
concluded that section 348(a) clearly demonstrated that Congress
intended the provisions of IIRIRA to apply retroactively to aliens in
deportation proceedings after IIRIRA’s enactment regardless of when the
offense occurred and that the restriction shall apply to aliens convicted of
the offense of “aggravated felonies” regardless of when the offense
occurred. Id. at 131.
CONCLUSION: The court ultimately held that Congress’s
unambiguous intent shows that IIRIRA shall apply retroactively to
offenses committed before the statute’s enactment. Id. at 129.
De La Vega v. Gonzales, 436 F.3d 141 (2d Cir. 2006)
QUESTION: “[W]hether this Court has jurisdiction to review a
denial by the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) of a petitioner’s
request for cancellation of removal on the basis of its finding that the
petitioner failed to demonstrate that his removal would cause
‘exceptional and extremely unusual hardship’ to a qualifying U.S. citizen
relative.” Id. at 141.
ANALYSIS: The court joined five sister courts in finding “the BIA’s
discretionary determinations concerning whether to grant cancellation of
removal [to] constitute “judgment[s] regarding the granting of relief
under section 1229b” within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i)
and therefore the review of such determinations falls outside [its]
jurisdiction.” Id. at 144. The court went on to find that “the BIA’s
judgment that an alien has failed to demonstrate that his removal will
cause a qualifying U.S. citizen relative to suffer ‘exceptional and
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extremely unusual hardship’ is discretionary” not only because all circuit
courts confronted with the issue had answered in the positive, but also
because “cases construing the scope of appellate jurisdiction to review
BIA denials of ‘suspension of deportation’–the predecessor to
‘cancellation of removal’–under the prior, “extreme hardship” statutory
formulation” regard such determinations as discretionary. Id. at 144-45.
CONCLUSION: The court ultimately made two finding: “(1)
‘exceptional and extremely unusual hardship’ determinations by the BIA
are discretionary judgments and (2) we therefore lack jurisdiction to
review such judgments, in accordance with 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i).”
Id. at 145-46.
Mastrovincenzo v. City of New York, 435 F.3d 78 (2d Cir. 2006)
QUESTION: Whether a New York City licensing requirement is
“narrowly tailored in its application to . . . vendors of regular
merchandise with sufficient expressive content to qualify for First
Amendment protection.” Id. at 102.
ANALYSIS: “[W]hether a regulation is narrowly-tailored can only
be determined upon a context-specific inquiry.” Id. at 102. The 2nd
Circuit further explained that “New York City’s licensing requirement is
clearly a content-neutral speech restriction because it ‘serves purposes
unrelated to the content of [the regulated] expression,’ namely: (1)
keeping the public streets free of congestion for the convenience and
safety of its citizens, (2) maintaining the ‘tax base and economic viability
of the City,’ and (3) preventing the sale of ‘stolen, defective or
counterfeit merchandises.’” Id. at 99 (citing Hobbs v. County of
Westchester, 397 F.3d 133, 150 (2d. Cir. 2005); Mastrovincenzo v. City
of New York, 313 F. Supp. 2d 280, 283 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)). Merely
because “New York City differentiates between categories of vendors—
that is, vendors of written materials, paintings, photographs, prints and
sculptures are exempt from its licensing requirement while other vendors
are not—does not suggest that the City’s regulation targets particular
messages and favors others.” Id. In addition, the court noted, “[the
regulation] in no way precludes plaintiffs from reaching public audiences
on the sidewalks generally or in any of the specific venues where they
currently hawk their wares.” Id. at 101. Despite the regulation, “plaintiffs
have numerous alternative channels through which to share their art with
the public.” Id. The court held that “the alternative avenues of
communication available to plaintiffs, taken together, [were] more than
‘ample.’” Id. at 102.
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CONCLUSION: Thus, “notwithstanding Bery v. City of New York, 97
F.3d 689 (2d Cir. 1996), [the licensing requirement was] sufficiently
narrowly tailored to satisfy intermediate scrutiny.” Id.
THIRD CIRCUIT
Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Lendingtree, Inc., 425 F.3d 211 (3d
Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: Whether the nominative fair use defense is recognized
in the 3rd Circuit in an action for trademark infringement. Id. at 218.
ANALYSIS: As an issue of first impression in the 3rd Circuit, the
court disagreed with the 9th Circuit, which had denounced the
“likelihood of confusion” test. Id. at 220. The 3rd Circuit, while agreeing
“with the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals that a distinct analysis is
needed for nominative fair use cases,” concluded that the “likelihood of
confusion” test should not be completely supplanted. Id. Thus, the court
“disagree[d] with the fundamental distinction the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals drew between classic and nominative fair use” and instead, set
forth a two-step approach of its own. Id. at 221-22. “The plaintiff must
first prove that confusion is likely due to the defendant’s use of
plaintiff’s mark. . . . Once plaintiff has met its burden of proving that
confusion is likely, the burden then shifts to defendant to show that its
nominative use of plaintiff’s mark is nonetheless fair. Id. at 222. “To
demonstrate fairness, the defendant must satisfy a three-pronged
nominative fair use test, derived to a great extent from the one articulated
by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Under our fairness test, a
defendant must show: (1) that the use of plaintiff’s mark is necessary to
describe both the plaintiff’s product or service and the defendant’s
product or service; (2) that the defendant uses only so much of the
plaintiff’s mark as is necessary to describe plaintiff’s product; and (3)
that the defendant’s conduct or language reflect the true and accurate
relationship between plaintiff and defendant’s products or services.” Id.
CONCLUSION: “We hold today that the burden of proving
likelihood of confusion, even in a nominative use case, should remain
with the plaintiff.” Id. at 226.
McGowan v. NJR Service Corp., 423 F.3d 241 (3d Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: Are “the administrators of a retirement plan that is
covered by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
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(‘ERISA’) . . . required to recognize an individual’s waiver of her
beneficiary interest under the plan?” Id. at 243.
ANALYSIS: Title 29 of U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(D) “dictates that it is
the documents on file with the Plan, and not outside private agreements
between beneficiaries and participants, that determine the rights of the
parties.” Id. at 245-46. Thus, “any requirement imposed on Plan
administrators to look beyond these documents would go against the
specific command of § 1104(a)(1)(D).” Id. at 246. “‘[O]ne of the
principal goals underlying ERISA . . . [is] ensuring that ‘plans be
uniform in their interpretation and simple in their application.’” Id.
(quoting McMillan v. Parrott, 913 F.2d 310, 312 (6th Cir. 1990)). “This
extremely important policy goal is best served by the conclusion that,
under § 1104(a)(1)(D), outside waivers are not binding on Plan
administrators.” Id.
CONCLUSION: “Plan administrators are not required to look beyond
Plan documents to determine whether a waiver has been effectuated in a
private agreement between the participant and his [or her] named
beneficiary.” Id. at 242.
Interfaith Cmty. Org. v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 426 F.3d 694 (3d Cir.
2005)
FIRST QUESTION: “Whether a court should look to prevailing rates
in the attorney’s home community or the locus of the litigation in
determining the appropriate compensation for an out-of-town attorney.”
Id. at 705.
ANALYSIS: The court first looked to one of its previous decisions,
In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litigation, 751 F.2d 562 (3d Cir. 1984), where
the court “held that it was error for a district court to apply ‘hypothetical
national rates’ in determining the size of a fee award.” Id. at 705. The
court looked to the recommendation of a task force it commissioned two
decades earlier which recommended a “forum rate” rule whereby an
“out-of-town lawyer would receive not the hourly rate prescribed by his
district but rather the hourly rate prevailing in the forum in which the
litigation is lodged.” Id. at 704. The court found that while in most cases
a “forum rate” should apply, there were “two exceptions: first ‘when the
need for the special expertise of counsel from a distant district is shown’;
and, second, ‘when local counsel are unwilling to handle the case.’” Id.
at 705.
CONCLUSION: The “district courts in the Third Circuit should
award attorney fees based on the ‘forum rate’ rule as set forth in the Task
Force Report.” Id. at 705.
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SECOND QUESTION: “Whether a prevailing party is entitled to
compensation for the costs of non-testifying experts under a fee-shifting
statute.” Id. at 715.
ANALYSIS: The court reviewed decisions in both the D.C. Circuit
and the 11th Circuit, but found none to be entirely on point. Id. at 71516. Instead, the court looked to the Supreme Court decision in Missouri
v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274 (1989), where the Court found “the phrase
‘reasonable attorney’s fee’ can encompass work performed by
individuals who are not attorneys.” Id. at 716. The Supreme Court
continued that “[r]ather, the term must refer to a reasonable fee for the
work product of an attorney.” Id. The 3rd Circuit reasoned that “[t]o
forbid the shifting of the expert’s fee would encourage
underspecialization and inefficient trial preparation, just as to forbid
shifting the cost of paralegals would encourage lawyers to do paralegals
work.” Id. Concurring with the 7th Circuit, the 3rd Circuit noted that
“prohibiting reimbursement for the fees of non-testifying experts would
simply encourage attorneys to educate themselves, undoubtedly at higher
costs.” Id. at 716-17.
CONCLUSION: The 3rd Circuit concluded that “a prevailing party is
entitled to compensation for the costs of non-testifying experts under a
fee-shifting statute.” Id. at 715.
Garcia v. Plaza Oldsmobile Ltd., 421 F.3d 216 (3d Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: “[W]hether the court should use Pennsylvania common
law or New York’s statutory law to determine if [defendant-owner, a
New York corporation with its principal place of business in that state]
can be liable” for the acts of a New York citizen-driver who injured a
Pennsylvania citizen in Pennsylvania while driving a rented motor
vehicle from defendant corporation. Id. at 219.
ANALYSIS: In “exercise[ing] plenary review over the choice of law
question raised in this appeal,” the court first noted that it must apply the
choice-of-law rules of the jurisdiction in which the district court sits, here
Pennsylvania. Id. Subsequently, pursuant to Pennsylvania law, the court
must determine what type of “conflict” exists between the purported
competing bodies of law before assessing the governmental interests of
the jurisdictions whose law may control, and examine those contacts
within the dispute. Id. An “‘interest analysis’ . . . determine[s] whether
the case involves a true or false conflict or whether it is unprovided for.”
Id. at 220. In conducting this analysis, the court found that the case
presented a false conflict because “there is a true conflict [only] ‘when
the governmental interest of both jurisdictions would be impaired if their
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law were not applied.’” Id. (citing Lacey v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 932
F.2d 170, 187 & n.15 (3d Cir. 1991)). In cases of “false conflict, [courts]
apply the law of the only interested jurisdiction.” Id.
CONCLUSION: The court determined that the case presented “a
false conflict” because “applying New York law to impose liability [on
the defendant] does not impair the interests of Pennsylvania, while on the
contrary, the application of Pennsylvania law would impair New York’s
interest in providing injured plaintiffs with a financially responsible
defendant, and imposing a high degree of responsibility on the owners of
vehicle[s].” Id. at 223. Thus, the 3rd Circuit affirmed the district court’s
grant of summary judgment in finding that the law of the interested
jurisdiction, here New York, should apply. Id. at 223-224.
Slagle v. County of Clarion, 435 F.3d 262 (3d Cir. 2006)
QUESTION: “[W]hether the participation clause of section 704(a)
[of Title VII] protects an employee who files a facially invalid claim for
retaliatory discharge.” Id. at 266.
ANALYSIS: Slagle alleged that he was terminated from his position
as a Corrections Officer because of “unlawful retaliation in violation of
Title VII.” Id. at 264. The district court granted summary judgment
holding that Slagle had failed to “establish that he engaged in protected
activity, which is an essential element of a prima facie case of retaliation
under Title VII.” Id. The court noted that a “plaintiff need only allege
discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin
to be protected from retaliatory discharge under Title VII. Protection is
not lost merely because an employee is mistaken on the merits of his or
her claim.” Id. at 268. However, the court continued, “Slagle’s
complaint, with its vague allegations of ‘civil rights’ violations, did not
meet even this low bar.” Id.
CONCLUSION: The 3rd Circuit, consistent with the 4th and 9th
Circuits, held that “we cannot dispense with the requirement that the
plaintiff allege prohibited grounds” to constitute a valid retaliatory claim
under Title VII. Id. at 267.
FOURTH CIRCUIT
United States v. Amaya-Portillo, 423 F.3d 427 (4th Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: The Fourth Circuit looked at “whether a state
conviction for possession of cocaine can ultimately qualify as an
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‘aggravated felony’ under section 2L1.2 [of the United States Sentencing
Guidelines] if it is [classified as] a misdemeanor under the applicable
state law and punishable only as a misdemeanor under the Controlled
Substances Act (“CSA”), 21 U.S.C. § 801.” Id. at 430-31.
ANALYSIS: The statutory language of the Sentencing Guidelines, §
2L1.2(b)(1)(C) is evidence that “Congress did not intend for the same
definition of ‘felony’ as a crime punishable by more than one year of
imprisonment to apply” to felony drug offenses punishable under the
CSA. Id. at 432. The court found compelling that Congress could have
but ultimately did not define a “‘drug trafficking crime’ as a drug offense
punishable by imprisonment for more than one year.” Id. at 435. The
court also found persuasive arguments from “seven other circuits, each
of which conducted the ‘aggravated felony’ inquiry by focusing upon the
‘classification’ of an offense under state law rather than upon potential
punishment.” Id. at 432. The court noted that it applied the analysis it
used in a similar case, in essence rejecting the rule adopted by the 6th
and 9th Circuits. Id. at 430, 435.
CONCLUSION: Under Maryland law, although the defendant’s
offense carried a possible sentence of more than one year imprisonment,
it is classified as a misdemeanor. Id. at 428. In addition, possession of
cocaine “is neither classified as a felony by Federal or Maryland law [but
is classified as a misdemeanor] . . . the offense is not a ‘felony’ under 21
U.S.C. § 802(13), nor an ‘aggravated felony’ under section 2L1.2 of the
Sentencing Guidelines.” Id. at 435. Ultimately, the court “conclude[d]
that a ‘felony’ under the CSA means ‘any Federal or State offense
classified by applicable Federal or [State] law as a felony.” Id. In doing
so, the court deferred “to a state’s judgment, not as to the appropriate
punishment, but as to whether the offense is a felony.” Id.
United States v. Fitzgerald, 435 F.3d 484 (4th Cir. 2006)
QUESTION: Whether the application of 18 U.S.C. § 3147 can
enhance a sentence for the crime of failing to appear at a criminal
sentencing under 18 U.S.C. § 3146. Id. at 486.
ANALYSIS: The court stated that “[u]nder § 3147, a person who is
convicted of committing an offense while on release . . . ‘shall be
sentenced, in addition to the sentence prescribed for the offense to (1) a
term of imprisonment of not more than ten years imprisonment if the
offense is a felony . . .’ [that] ‘incorporates this provision . . . by
requiring a three-level increase to the base offense level when . . . § 3147
is applicable.’” Id. at 485. (quoting United States v. Kincaid, 964 F.2d
325, 327 (4th Cir. 1992)).
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CONCLUSION: The court held that “the plain language of § 3147
provides for the district court’s enhancement of [the defendant’s]
sentence.” Id. at 487. Because Double Jeopardy does not apply to this
sentence, it was affirmed. Id.
FIFTH CIRCUIT
United States v. Jackson, 426 F.3d 301 (5th Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: “[W]hether incarceration for a parole violation that was
later held unconstitutional by a state court tolls the defendant’s period of
supervised release under 18 U.S.C. § 3624 (2005).” Id. at 301.
ANALYSIS: The court began its analysis by looking to the plain
language of the statute. Id. at 304. The language is clear: “the period of
supervised release does not run during imprisonment.” Id. If
incarceration reduced the period of supervised release, the rehabilitative
objectives of that program would be void. Id. at 305.
CONCLUSION: Thus, the court held that “[the defendant’s] prior
incarceration tolled his supervised release and thereby extended the
period he must submit to supervised release.” Id. at 302.
Caldwell v. Dretke, 429 F.3d 521 (5th Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: “[W]hether orders of deferred adjudication community
supervision and straight probation are final judgments for purposes of the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) oneyear statute of limitations.” Id. at 522.
ANALYSIS: In this case, orders of deferred adjudication were
entered against petitioners after they pled guilty to various crimes. Id. at
523-25. Petitioners filed habeas petitions more than one year after the
entry of these judgments. Id. Lower courts held that petitioners’ habeas
petitions were time barred by AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations.
Id. The court explained that AEDPA mandates that “‘an application for a
writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of
a State court’ be filed within one-year of ‘the date on which the judgment
became final.’” Id. at 525. In reasoning that deferred adjudications are
final judgments, the court noted that Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure defines them as such; they are appealable; and treating
them as final judgments fulfills the congressional intent in passing the
one-year statute of limitations to “‘curb the abuse of the statutory writ of
habeas corpus’” which applies to habeas petitions. Id. 527-28 (quoting

476

SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW

[Vol. 2:459

H.R. Rep. No. 104-518, at 111 (1996)). The court added that the deferred
adjudication became final “by the conclusion of direct review or the
expiration of the time for seeking such review.” Id. at 529.
CONCLUSION: The court held that the “orders of deferred
adjudication . . . and straight probation are final judgments for purposes
of [AEDPA’s] one-year statute of limitations.” Id. at 523.
Praylor v. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice, 430 F.3d 1208 (5th Cir.
2005)
QUESTION: Whether a prison’s decision to decline “to provide a
transsexual with hormone treatment amounts to acting with deliberate
indifference to a serious medical need.” Id. at 1209.
ANALYSIS: Relying on three other circuit decisions (White v.
Farrier, 849 F.2d 322 (8th Cir. 1988); Meriwether v. Faulkner, 821 F.2d
408 (7th Cir. 1987); and Supre v. Ricketts, 792 F.2d 958 (10th Cir.
1986)) the 5th Circuit found that the prison’s medical analysis was
considerate and thorough. Id.
CONCLUSION: The court held that the “refusal to provide hormone
therapy [for incarcerated transsexuals] did not constitute” deliberate
indifference. Id.
United States v. Burns, 433 F.3d 442 (5th Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: Whether an otherwise valid appeal waiver is rendered
invalid, or inapplicable to an appeal seeking to raise a Booker or Fanfan
issue, merely because the waiver was made before Booker. Id.
ANALYSIS: A waiver of a right to appeal must be voluntary,
knowing and intelligent with “sufficient awareness of the relevant
circumstances and likely consequences.” Id. at 449 (citing Brady v.
United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970)). The validity of the waiver is
determined by the totality of the circumstances. Id. In Brady, the
petitioner argued that a statute, which was later held unconstitutional,
coerced his guilty plea. Id. (citing Brady, 397 U.S. at 743-44). The
Supreme Court rejected that contention, holding that “‘absent
misrepresentation or other impermissible conduct by state agents,’” the
waiver is valid. Id. (quoting Brady, 397 U.S. at 757). Other circuits have
rejected the argument that a defendant’s waiver of appeal prior to Booker
does not render such waiver invalid while relying on Brady. Id.
CONCLUSION: “[A]n otherwise valid appeal waiver is not rendered
invalid, or inapplicable to an appeal seeking to raise a Booker or Fanfan
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issue . . . merely because the waiver was made before Booker.” Id. at
450.
United States v. Arbizu, 431 F.3d 469 (5th Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: “Whether failure to provide written notice of the terms
of supervised release automatically invalidates a revocation of such
release if the defendant received actual notice of the conditions.” Id. at
470.
ANALYSIS: “The purpose of §§ 3583(f) and 3603(1) is to ensure
that the defendant is notified of the conditions of his supervised release.
Congress decided that requiring the probation officer to provide the
defendant with written notice of the conditions is the best way to ensure
the defendant knows what is expected of him during the supervised
release periods. It would be patently unfair to revoke a defendant’s
supervised release and send him back to prison for violating conditions
of the release that he had no way of knowing existed.” Id. at 471. The 5th
Circuit followed the reasoning and conclusion of the 1st, 8th, and 9th
Circuits on this issue. Id. at 470.
CONCLUSION: The “[g]overnment’s failure to provide the notice
required by the statutes does not limit the district court’s authority to
revoke supervised release where the defendant had actual notice of the
release terms.” Id.
Withhart v. Otto Candies, L.L.C., 431 F.3d 840 (5th Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: The court considered “whether a shipowner-employer
may assert a negligence and indemnity claim against its seamanemployee for property damage allegedly caused by the employee’s
negligence.” Id. at 841.
ANALYSIS: The court noted that the employer’s claims “are
consistent with general maritime law.” Id. at 842. The court reasoned that
the “Federal Employer’s Liability Act (“FELA”), 45 U.S.C. §§ 51, et
seq., and consequently, the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. App. § 688, contain[ed]
no prohibition against a general maritime negligence and indemnity
claim by a ship-owner employee against its seaman-employee for
property damage.” Id. at 841.
CONCLUSION: Ultimately, the court held that the shipowneremployer could assert a claim against an employee for property damage
arising from the employee’s negligence. Id.
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United States v. Adair, 436 F.3d 520 (5th Cir. 2006)
QUESTION: Whether the court should remand for resentencing a
case in which the district court imposed a lower alternative sentence
based on belief that the Supreme Court’s decision in Blakely v.
Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), may have invalidated the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines. Id. at 528.
ANALYSIS: The 5th Circuit explained that Blakely does apply to the
sentencing guidelines in the sense that it establishes that “it violates a
defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury for a judge to
enhance a sentence based on facts neither admitted by the defendant nor
proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (citing United States v.
Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 242-43 (2005)). However, the court also found
that “there is nothing in the record to suggest that the district court
anticipated Booker’s remedial holding [which made the sentencing
guidelines advisory] and considered the sentencing guidelines as one
factor among others listed in 18 U.S. C. § 3553(a).” Id.
CONCLUSION: The district court’s decision to impose the
alternative sentence is invalid under Supreme Court precedent and the
sentencing guidelines. Id. at 529.
Mello v. Sara Lee Corp., 431 F.3d 440 (5th Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: “Is ERISA-estoppel a cognizable legal theory?” Id. at
444.
ANALYSIS: The 5th Circuit joined the majority of circuits in
“explicitly adopting ERISA-estoppel as a cognizable theory.” Id. The
court held that “[t]o establish an ERISA-estoppel claim, the plaintiff
must establish: (1) a material misrepresentation; (2) reasonable and
detrimental reliance upon the representation; and (3) extraordinary
circumstances.” Id. “Plaintiffs are able to satisfy the material
misrepresentation element if their employers misrepresented any
pertinent information.” Id. at 445. The court noted that, “material
misrepresentations can be made in informal documents.” Id. The 5th
Circuit held that, “it was unreasonable for Mello to rely on Sara Lee’s
informal material misrepresentations regarding his benefits and Mello
cannot establish his estoppel claim. ERISA’s policy against informal
modifications of plan terms precludes a finding that Mello reasonably
relied on the benefit statements’ pension amounts.” Id.
CONCLUSION: The 5th Circuit adopted ERISA-estoppel but
“[b]ecause Mello has not satisfied the reasonable reliance, he cannot
establish that ERISA-estoppel should be applied to preclude Sara Lee
from correcting the amount of his pension benefits.” Id. at 448.
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SIXTH CIRCUIT
Gibson Guitar Corp. v. Paul Reed Smith Guitars, L.P., 423 F.3d 539
(6th Cir. 2005).
QUESTION: May the “initial-interest-confusion” doctrine be used as
a substitute for actual confusion in order to find infringement of a
trademark on a product’s shape? Id. at 551.
ANALYSIS: The 6th Circuit began by explaining that “[i]nitialinterest confusion takes place when a manufacturer improperly uses a
trademark to create initial customer interest in a product, even if the
customer realizes, prior to purchase, that the product was not actually
manufactured by the trademark holder.” Id. at 549. The court then noted
that “[t]he potential ramifications of applying this judicially created
doctrine to product-shape trademarks are different from the ramifications
of applying the doctrine to trademarks on a product’s name, a company’s
name, or a company’s logo.” Id. at 551 n.15. For the court, these
ramifications included allowing “trademark holders to protect not only
the actual product shapes they have trademarked, but also a ‘penumbra’
of more or less similar shapes that would not otherwise qualify for
trademark protection.” Id. Another ramification the court highlighted was
the potential for anticompetitive behavior based on the fact that allowing
initial-interest-confusion to apply in the context of a product’s shape
“would make it substantially easier for product-shape trademark-holders
to survive a defendant’s summary-judgment motion than for plaintiffs
alleging any other type of trademark infringement.” Id.
CONCLUSION: Based on these concerns, the 6th Circuit would not
“go so far as to hold that there is never a circumstance in which it would
be appropriate to apply the initial-interest-confusion doctrine to a product
shape trademark.” Id. However, the court did not find that such an
allowance would be appropriate in this case. Id.
Brumbalough v. Camelot Care Centers, Inc., 427 F.3d 996 (6th Cir.
2005)
QUESTION: “Whether a plaintiff is able to recover compensatory
damages for emotional distress” that resulted from an employment
termination in violation of the Family and Medical Leave Act
(“FMLA”). Id. at 1007.
ANALYSIS: “[T]he FMLA specifically lists the types of damages
that an employer may be liable for, and it includes damages only insofar
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as they are the actual monetary losses of the employee such as salary and
benefits and certain liquidated damages, the FMLA does not permit
recovery for emotional distress.” Id.
CONCLUSION: The court held that “damages for emotional distress
are not allowed under the FMLA.” Id. at 1008.
Andretti v. Borla Performance Indus., 426 F.3d 824 (6th Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: Whether this court should apply the clear error or de
novo standard to review offers of judgment under FED. R. CIV. P. Rule 68
Id. at 837.
ANALYSIS: The court considered decisions in the 3rd, 5th, 7th, 9th,
10th and 11th Circuits and concluded that it “should apply general
contract principles to interpret Rule 68 offers of judgment.” Id.
CONCLUSION: The court decided to “review de novo the legal
interpretations of Rule 68 and review for clear error the factual findings
concerning the circumstances under which Rule 68 offers were made.”
Id.
United States v. McClain, 430 F.3d 299 (6th Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: How should the court reconcile the good faith
exception for the exclusion of evidence, as established in Leon, with the
“fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine from Nardone? Id. at 307.
ANALYSIS: After holding that a police search was unconstitutional
under the Fourth Amendment, the court had to determine if warrants
derived from this unconstitutional search were also illegal. Id. The 9th
and 11th Circuits had found that any good faith on behalf of investigators
did not sanitize the results of a warrantless search. Id. The 2nd and 8th
Circuits had held, in some circumstances, the opposite view. The 8th
Circuit found the Leon exception applicable “when circumstances
surrounding both the initial detention of [evidence] and the subsequent
issuance of the warrant were ‘sufficiently close to the line of validity’
that the officers had ‘an objectively reasonable belief that they possessed
a reasonable suspicion such as would support the valid detention of [the
evidence] as well as an objectively reasonable belief that the warrant
issued was valid.” Id. at 308 (quoting United States v. Fletcher, 91 F.3d
48, 51-52 (8th Cir. 1996)).
CONCLUSION: The court determined that although there was a prior
Fourth Amendment violation, the good faith exception should apply, and
the evidence was improperly excluded at the trial court. Id. at 309. “The
exclusion of evidence will not further the purposes of the exclusionary
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rule ‘when an officer acting with objective good faith has obtained a
search warrant from a judge or magistrate and acted within its scope.’”
Id. (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 920 (1984)).
Reeb v. Ohio Dep’t of Rehab. & Corr., 435 F.3d 639 (6th Cir. 2006)
QUESTION: “Whether Title VII plaintiffs can bring a class action
for injunctive or declaratory relief in the same action that seeks
compensatory damages under FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2).” Id. at 653
(Keith, J., dissenting).
ANALYSIS: The court noted that the Supreme Court’s holding in
Gen. Tel. Co. of the Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, (1982), required
plaintiffs requesting class certification in Title VII cases “to allege
‘significant proof’ that [a company] operated under a general policy of
gender discrimination that resulted in gender discrimination manifesting
itself in ‘the same general fashion’’ as to each of the kinds of
discriminatory treatment upon which the pattern-or-practice class action
rests.” Id. at 644 (quoting Reeb v. Ohio Dep’t of Rehab. & Corr., 81
F.App’x 550, 559 (6th Cir. 2003). The court discussed the 5th Circuit’s
holding in Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., which found that “claims
for individual compensatory and punitive damages were very
particularized inquiries . . . [thus,] the damages were not ‘incidental’ to
the requested injunctive or declaratory relief.” Id. at 648 (quoting Allison
v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 414-15 (5th Cir.1998)). This
contrasts with the 2nd and 9th Circuits, which found that a court could,
in its discretion, certify a class action under Title VII despite claims for
compensatory and punitive damages. Id. at 648-49.
CONCLUSION: The court followed Allison and held that “because
of the individualized nature of damages calculations . . . the claims for
individual compensatory damages of members of a Title VII class
necessarily predominate over requested declaratory or injunctive relief,
and individual compensatory damages [were] not recoverable by a Rule
23(b)(2) class.” Id. at 651.
Patel v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 685 (6th Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: Whether the elimination of the 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i)
waiver for parents of United States citizens has a retroactive effect. Id. at
690.
ANALYSIS: The court noted that “[o]nly . . . the Ninth and Fourth
Circuits have addressed this issue” and both held that the waiver does not
have a retroactive affect.” Id. In addition, the court discussed the
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Supreme Court’s decision in INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001). Id. “In
St. Cyr, the Supreme Court held that IIRIRA’s elimination of [a]
discretionary waiver . . . had a retroactive effect as applied to [specific]
persons . . .” Id. at 690-91. The 6th Circuit, however, “limit[s] the
application of St. Cyr to aliens who plead guilty to removable offenses
prior to the enactment of IIRIRA regardless of when the removable
offenses occurred.” Id. at 691. The 6th Circuit also recognized that 8
U.S.C. § 1182(i) was “not intended to apply retroactively.” Id.
Ultimately, the court explained that the Landgraf factors “weigh against
finding a retroactive effect” on the petitioners. Id. (citing Landgraf v. Usi
Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 269-70 (1994)).
CONCLUSION: “[T]he application of [8 U.S.C. § 1182(i)] . . . does
not have a retroactive effect, the IJ properly applied the current version
[8 U.S.C. § 1182(i)].” Id. at 689.
Bowles v. Russell, 432 F.3d 668 (6th Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: Where a petitioner does not receive timely notice of a
district court’s final ruling, thus foreclosing the petitioner’s ability to file
a timely appeal, may the petitioner seek relief and obtain a fourteen-day
extension under FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(6)? Id. at 669-70. If, in such a
situation, the district court grants the “requested relief but mistakenly
offer[s] an erroneous deadline” for filing of an appeal, should the
erroneous deadline control, or is the fourteen-day period set out under
Rule 4(a)(6) “not susceptible to extension through mistake, courtesy, or
grace[?]” Id. at 669.
ANALYSIS: The 6th Circuit stated that for the extension beyond the
fourteen-day period set out under Rule 4(a)(6) to control it would need to
satisfy the test established by the Supreme Court in Osterneck v. Ernst &
Whinney, 489 U.S. 169 (1989). Id. at 657. The 6th Circuit stated that
under the Osterneck test, such an extension would be applicable “‘only
where a party has performed an act which, if properly done, would
postpone the deadline for filing his appeal and has received specific
assurance by a judicial officer that this act has been properly done.’” Id.
The 6th Circuit found that petitioner’s situation did not fit within the
Osterneck test for three reasons. Id. “First, petitioner’s act did not
attempt to postpone a deadline for filing his appeal; it was to move for
reopening of the appeal period.” Id. “Second, it was, in fact, the district
court here that performed the improper act . . . [and clearly] the district
court is not a party.” Id. Third, the Osterneck rule “requires that judicial
assurances follow the actions of the party. Here, in contrast, the judicial
assurance precedes the party’s act.” Id.
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CONCLUSION: Where a district court erroneously extends the time
to file a timely notice of appeal beyond fourteen days, it is the fourteenday period set out under Rule 4(a)(6) that controls, and not the erroneous
judicial order. Id. at 669-676.
United States v. Blood, 435 F.3d 612 (6th Cir. 2006)
QUESTION: What is “the meaning of the phrase ‘with intent to
deceive another’ found in 18 U.S.C. § 513(a), which prohibits possession
of counterfeit and forged securities with this deceptive intent.” Id. at 616.
ANALYSIS: The defendants argued that the word “another” meant
an entity other than the one which issued the security. Id. at 618-19. The
court disagreed with the defendant’s reading of United States v. Thomas,
54 F.3d 73 (2d Cir. 1995). The Thomas court, in the view of the 6th
Circuit, held that the word “another” did include the issuer of the
security. Id. at 619. The 6th Circuit agreed with the conclusion that
“another” included the issuer of the security by contrasting the use of the
word “another” in the statute with the word “whoever.” Id. Thus, where
the statute says that “whoever” engages in the prohibited act “with intent
to deceive another,” the word “another” means one other than the
individual committing the prohibited act. Id.
CONCLUSION: The word “another” includes “the intent to deceive
the purported issuers of the fraudulent securities in question.” Id. at 622.
SEVENTH CIRCUIT
Illinois Dep’t of Revenue v. Hayslett/Judy Oil, Inc., 426 F.3d 899 (7th
Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: “Whether the Illinois Motor Fuel Tax falls under [11
U.S.C.] § 507(a)(8)(C) or § 507(a)(8)(E).” Id. at 902.
ANALYSIS: The 7th Circuit noted that to determine “whether a tax
falls within the purview of subsection C” the court must decide whether
“the tax is imposed on the consumer or the retailer.” Id. at 903. “The
Illinois Supreme Court has ruled that a prior version of the Tax was
assessed on the consumer and not the distributor.” Id. at 904. The 7th
Circuit then noted that “[t]he plain language of the statute itself leads to
the same conclusion.” Id. The court found that the tax met a two-part test
for inclusion under subsection C that it had previously established. Id.
CONCLUSION: The 7th Circuit found that because the defendant
collected taxes from consumers, even though it “may be an excise tax,” it
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was “an excise tax imposed on consumers that is collected by a third
party” and that it accordingly should fall under § 507(a)(8)(C). Id. at
904-05.
United States v. McKissic, 428 F.3d 719 (7th Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: Whether constructive notice is enough warning when a
court wishes to impose special conditions of education, employment and
community service requirements for the supervised release of an inmate.
Id. at 725.
ANALYSIS: The 7th Circuit determined that special conditions at
issue were listed among the discretionary conditions that may be
imposed by the court, under 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b). Id. Agreeing with the
5th, 9th, and 10th Circuits, the 7th Circuit held that constructive notice
was adequate for conditions that are explicitly named in the statute. Id. at
725-26.
CONCLUSION: Since the special conditions of education,
employment, and community service requirements are contemplated
within the supervised release statute, actual notice is not required before
the court may impose them. Id. at 726.
United States v. Arnaout, 431 F.3d 994 (7th Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: Whether a defendant “need not be convicted of a
federal crime of terrorism as defined by § 2332b(g)(5)(B) for the district
court to apply [a federal terrorism sentencing enhancement].” Id. 100001.
ANALYSIS: The court reviewed an 11th Circuit opinion, which
expressly confronted this issue and held that the statutory language
“unambiguously cast a broader net by applying the enhancement to any
offense that ‘involved’ or was ‘intended to promote’ a terrorism crime.”
Id. at 1002 (quoting United States v. Mandhai, 375 F.3d 1243, 1247
(11th Cir. 2004). The Sixth Circuit had held the same. Id. (citing United
States v. Graham, 275 F.3d 490, 517 (6th Cir. 2001)).
CONCLUSION: The court held that a terrorism sentencing
enhancement could be applied even when the underlying crime was not
terrorism, but “a district court must identify which enumerated federal
crime of terrorism the defendant intended to promote, satisfy the
elements of § 2332b(g)(5)(A), and support its conclusions by a
preponderance of the evidence with facts from the record,” thus
satisfying the Booker requirements for the Federal Guidelines. Id.
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EIGHTH CIRCUIT
United States v. Smith, 422 F.3d 715 (8th Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: Whether the “categorization of the reckless use of a
firearm [regardless of it resulting in actual physical injury] as a crime of
violence” as defined by United States Sentencing Guidelines, § 4B1.2, is
proper. Id. at 721.
ANALYSIS: Citing decisions from the 6th and 7th Circuits, the 8th
Circuit found that regardless of whether there was actual physical injury
to another or intent to harm, “discharging a firearm is an inherently risky
act.” Id. at 722 (citing United States v. Cole, 298 F.3d 659, 662 (7th Cir.
2002)). The court also noted that it has “previously concluded that
certain firearm offenses that do not necessarily result in or require
physical injury constitute crimes of violence . . . [just as] mere
possession of a short-barreled shotgun is a crime of violence.” Id.
Similarly, “[t]he common theme throughout these cases is that the
recklessness of the act matters, not the intended target or actual victim.”
Id. (citing Shepard v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 1254, 1257-58 (2005)).
CONCLUSION: Ultimately, the court held that the “district court
properly held that the Iowa offense of the reckless use of a firearm is a
crime of violence as defined by § 4B1.2.” Id. at 732. Essentially,
“recklessly using a firearm around others always creates a serious risk of
injury.” Id.
In re Marlar, 432 F.3d 813 (8th Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: Whether for the purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 303(a), “an
alleged debtor in an involuntary bankruptcy case must timely assert his
or her status as a farmer as an affirmative defense, lest it be waived.” Id.
at 814.
ANALYSIS: In a 1998 involuntary bankruptcy hearing, a federal
bankruptcy court judged Marlar to be a debtor. Id. In December 2003,
Marlar challenged that hearing, “asserting that 11 U.S.C. § 303(a) strips
bankruptcy courts of subject matter jurisdiction over involuntary
bankruptcy petitions brought against farmers.” Id. Marlar “contended
that he was a farmer when the involuntary petition was filed and that,
accordingly, the bankruptcy proceedings against him should [have been]
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.” Id. The 8th Circuit adopted the 5th
Circuit’s reasoning, which determined that status as a farmer is an
affirmative defense rather than a question of the bankruptcy court’s
jurisdiction. Id. (citation omitted). The court determined that § 303(a)
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requires that “a farmer against whom an involuntary petition is filed must
timely controvert the petition by raising his or her status as a farmer in
order to preclude the commencement of an involuntary case.” Id. at 815.
CONCLUSION: The court held “that an alleged debtor must timely
assert his or her status in one of the exempted categories as an
affirmative defense. If the alleged debtor fails to timely raise the issue, it
is waived.” Id.
NINTH CIRCUIT
Reynolds v. Hartford Fin. Servs. Group, Inc., 435 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir.
2006)
QUESTION: “Does [the Fair Credit Reporting Act’s (“FCRA”)]
adverse action notice requirement apply to the rates first charged in an
initial policy of insurance or is it limited to an increase in a rate that the
consumer has previously been charged?” Id. at 1090.
ANALYSIS: The 9th Circuit began with the text of the statute to
determine the meaning of the term “adverse action.” Id. The court looked
to 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(k)(1)(B)(i) to define adverse action as “a denial or
cancellation of, an increase in any charge for, or a reduction or other
adverse or unfavorable change in the terms of coverage or amount of,
any insurance, existing or applied for, in connection with the
underwriting of insurance.” Id. The court then applied the ordinary
meaning of the terms “increase” and “charge” to refute the insurance
company’s argument that an increased charge only refers to a previous
charge a consumer has paid. Id. The court agreed, holding that affording
the statute its plain meaning would further the purpose of FCRA to
“promote the rights of consumers by giving them essential information
about how their credit report is used.” Id. at 1091-92.
CONCLUSION: “We hold that whenever because of [a consumer’s]
credit information a company charges a consumer a higher initial rate
than it would otherwise have charged, it has increased the charge within
the meaning of FCRA. Therefore, the fact that [the consumer’s] policy
was an initial one, and his rate was the initial rate charged, is of no
consequence.” Id. at 1092.
Clemens v. U.S. Dist. Court for Cent. Dist. of Cal., 428 F.3d 1175 (9th
Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: Whether a defendant, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455(a),
can disqualify all district judges in a particular district court “because of
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threats he allegedly made on the life and health of three judges in the
district.” Id. at 1179.
ANALYSIS: “[R]ecusal of an individual judge pursuant to § 455(a)
may be required when the judge himself has been subject of a personal
threat, unless the threat was motivated by a desire to recuse the judge.”
Id. at 1179. “No reasonable observer could conclude that a threat against
three judges based on their handling of the defendant’s pro se cases
should be construed as a threat against all the judges of the district.” Id.
at 1180. “[T]he threats that the defendant allegedly made were in no way
related to complaints about the Central District as an entity.” Id. Instead,
“the threats were aimed at particular judges perceived to have made
unfavorable rulings in the defendant’s pro se cases.” Id.
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit ruled that “[t]he district court
correctly held that mandatory disqualification of all judges on the Central
District of California was not justified under § 455(a).” Id.
Bona v. Gonzales, 425 F.3d 663 (9th Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: “[W]hether a paroled alien, who is also deemed an
arriving alien under 8 C.F.R. § 1.1(q), is properly precluded from
applying for adjustment of status in removal proceedings.” Id. at 667.
ANALYSIS: An application of the plain language revealed that the
petitioner was an “arriving alien.” Id. at 667-68. Then, the 9th Circuit,
persuaded by the petitioner’s argument, adopted the reasoning of Succar
v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 2005), which held that “8 C.F.R. § 245.1
(c)(8), the regulation that precludes arriving aliens from seeking
adjustment of status in removal proceedings, is valid.” Id. at 665.
CONCLUSION: The petitioner is entitled to apply for adjustment in
the removal proceedings. Id. at 664-65.
Ramadan v. Gonzales, 427 F.3d 1218 (9th Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: Whether a material change in circumstances affecting a
foreign citizen’s asylum eligibility constitutes a “question of law” under
8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D) (2005). Id. at 1219-20.
ANALYSIS: In this case, an Egyptian woman appealed the
immigration judge’s denial of her political asylum application because
she failed to file it within the mandatory one-year time period and did not
demonstrate a material change in circumstances that would have excused
her lateness. Id. at 1221. The court noted that a recently passed provision,
§ 1252(a)(2)(D), authorizes it to review decisions about the one-year
time bar that raise constitutional issues or questions of law. Id. The court
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for the first time decided whether a finding of a material change in
circumstances, or lack thereof, constitutes a question of law that is
subject to judicial review. Id. at 1221-22. The court reviewed
§1252(a)(2)(D)’s legislative history, concluding that a material change in
circumstances is a question of fact, not law. Id. at 1222.
CONCLUSION: A decision concerning the existence of a material
change in circumstances is not a question of law under § 1252(a)(2)(D)
and is not subject to judicial review. Id.
Camacho v. Bridgeport Financial Inc., 430 F.3d 1078 (9th Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: Whether a consumer’s dispute of the validity of a debt
under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C.A. §§
1692g and 1692e (2000 & 2005), must be in writing.
ANALYSIS: In analyzing a statute a court should examine the
statute’s plain meaning, whether the plain meaning would lead to absurd
or unreasonable results, and legislative intent. Id. at 1081. Further,
“where Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute
but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed
that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion
or exclusion.” Id. (citing Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23
(1983)). “The plain language of the text of § 1692g(a)(3) does not state
that the consumer must dispute the debt in writing.” Id. Allowing oral
communication “does not lead to absurd results because an oral dispute
triggers multiple statutory protections.” Id. at 1081-82. Oral
communication is also consistent with legislative intent of giving alleged
debtors an opportunity to respond to initial communications from a
collections agency. Id. at 1082.
CONCLUSION: There is no writing requirement implicit in §
1629g(a)(3).
United States v. Esparza-Gonzalez, 422 F.3d 897 (9th Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: “Whether under the struck jury system waivers of
peremptory strikes can form the basis of a Batson challenge.” Id. at 902.
ANALYSIS: Essentially, “[u]nder the struck jury system, when
either side waives a peremptory strike, this results in an excess number
of potential jurors, and therefore, the juror with the highest juror number
is removed from the jury panel. For this reason, a waiver of a peremptory
strike under this system is properly viewed as the effective removal of an
identifiable juror.” Id. at 899. In the present context, “[b]y waiving its
second peremptory strike, the prosecution effectively removed the only
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potential juror [with an allegedly similar ethnic heritage as the
defendant].” Id. at 899-900. The Supreme Court’s ruling in Batson, “held
that a ‘state’s privilege to strike individual jurors through peremptory
challenges[] is subject to the Equal Protection Clause.’” Id. at 901 (citing
Batson v. Kennedy, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986)). Thus, the 9th Circuit held
“that for purposes of determining whether . . . a Batson violation has
been established, waivers of peremptory strikes in a struck jury system
should be treated the same as exercises of peremptory strikes in an
alternate system.” Id. at 899.
CONCLUSION: The court “reverse[d] the district court’s finding that
the defendant failed to establish a prima facie case of [intentional]
discrimination.” Id. at 907. Given the practical effects of the struck jury
system, the failure to use a peremptory strike, standing alone without
other evidence of discriminatory intent, can form the basis of a Batson
challenge. Id.
Panaro v. City of North Las Vegas, 432 F.3d 949 (9th Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: “[W]hether a prisoner’s participation in an internal
investigation of official conduct should be considered equivalent to
exhausting a detention center’s available administrative grievance
procedure.” Id. at 953.
ANALYSIS: First, the court pointed to the Prison Litigation Reform
Act (“PLRA”), which “precludes an action by a prisoner ‘until such
available administrative remedies as are available have been exhausted.”
Id. Because the plaintiff did not “initiate, let alone exhaust, his
administrative remedies through that procedure” the court found the
PLRA to preclude plaintiff’s civil rights claim. Id. Second, the court
noted that the 6th Circuit had come to the same conclusion when
considering the issue at bar. Id.
CONCLUSION: Ultimately, the 9th Circuit adopted the rule that
“participating in an internal affairs investigation does not by itself satisfy
the exhaustion requirement of the PLRA.” Id.
Lindsey v. SLT Los Angeles, LLC, 432 F.3d 954 (9th Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: Whether the McDonnell Douglas test, as applied to
claims of employment discrimination, must be modified when applied to
“claims of racial discrimination in non-employment contracts arising
under 42 U.S.C. § 1981.” Id. at 959.
ANALYSIS: The court first held “that the first three elements of the
McDonnell Douglas test are easily adapted to claims arising under
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section 1981 outside of an employment context.” Id. Therefore, the
plaintiff must show that: “(1) it is a member of a protected class, (2) it
attempted to contract for certain services, and (3) it was denied the right
to contract for those services.” Id. As for the fourth element, which
requires “that such services remained available to similarly-situated
individuals who were not members of the plaintiff’s protected class,” the
court declined to determine whether such must be modified, finding that
the plaintiff “offered clear evidence that a similarly-situated group of a
different protected class was offered the contractual services which were
denied” to the plaintiff. Id.
CONCLUSION: Ultimately, the court applied all four elements of the
McDonnell Douglas test without modification.
Kenna v. U.S. Dist. Court for the Cent. Dist. of Cal., 435 F.3d 1011
(9th Cir. 2006)
QUESTION: Whether the court should grant a writ of mandamus
pursuant to the Crime Victim’s Rights Act (“CVRA”) because the lower
court denied the victim an opportunity to speak at a second codefendant’s sentencing merely because it believed that it had heard the
victim’s concerns at the first hearing. Id. at 1013
ANALYSIS: A writ of mandamus can be granted when the decision
merits review under the Bauman standard. Once the petitioner meets this
threshold standard, the court must then apply the Bauman factors and
determine if a writ should be granted. In this case, the petitioner raises an
issue of first impression, and therefore meets the threshold requirement
for review; thus, the court must apply the Bauman factors and determine
if writ should be granted. Id. at 1017. The underlying rationale in the
Bauman standard is to prevent interlocutory review. Id. However, in this
case, the writ was made pursuant to the CVRA, which specifically allows
for the interlocutory review that Bauman seeks to prevent. Id. Therefore,
the Bauman factors are inapplicable in the petitioner’s case. Instead,
under the CVRA, the 9th Circuit held that the court must issue the writ
when there is an abuse of discretion or legal error. Id. The court noted
that the 2nd Circuit has held similarly and that it is unaware of any
decision to the contrary. Id.
CONCLUSION: “The District Court here committed an error of law
by refusing to allow petitioner to allocute at Zvi’s sentencing and we
must therefore issue the writ.” Id.
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Hamilton v. Wash. State Plumbing & Pipefitting Indus. Pension Plan,
433 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2006)
QUESTION: Whether, “under ERISA, a QDRO can divest a
surviving spouse of her statutorily-guaranteed right to a QPSA only if the
QDRO expressly assigns surviving spouse rights to a former spouse.” Id.
ANALYSIS: The court first looked to the plain language of the
statute to determine the scope of the strict spousal consent privileges of §
1055 of ERISA and the interplay between § 1059(d)(3)(F) which states
that “‘[t]o the extent provided in any qualified domestic relations order,’
surviving spouse rights may be assigned to a ‘former spouse.’” Id. at
1098-99. The court determined that a QDRO must specifically assign
the rights under it to a former spouse in order to divest the surviving
spouse’s right to benefits under the pension plan. Id. The 9th Circuit also
found support for its interpretation of the statute in other circuits, citing
to 5th and 3rd Circuit precedent. Id. at 1100.
CONCLUSION: “[A] surviving spouse benefit must be explicitly
assigned to a former spouse in a QDRO in order to overcome the
surviving spouse’s right to a QPSA under ERISA.” Id. at 1103-04.
United States v. Pacheco-Navarette, 432 F.3d 967 (9th Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: Whether a guilty plea colloquy is deficient when a
court does not make a defendant aware of rights established by changes
in the law or subsequent judicial decisions. Id. at 969.
ANALYSIS: In this 9th Circuit case, defendant challenged his plea of
guilty which was made pursuant to a plea agreement. Id. at 968. The
court noted that FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 obligates a court to describe to a
defendant the consequences of the plea that have “‘a definite, immediate
and largely automatic effect on the range of [his] punishment.’” Id. at
969 (quoting United States v. Littlejohn, 224 F.3d 960, 965 (9th Cir.
2000)). The court stated that “potential changes in the law” have no such
effect on a defendant’s ultimate sentence. Id. Therefore, the court held
that defendant could not claim that a guilty plea was rendered unknowing
or involuntary when the lower court correctly stated his rights at the time
the colloquy was given. Id. The court noted the issue of first impression
and rested its holding on “well-established law stating that substantive
changes in the law do not invalidate guilty pleas.” Id. at 969 (citing
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 756-58 (1970); United States v.
Cardenas, 405 F.3d 1046, 1048 (9th Cir. 2005)).
CONCLUSION: The court held that “a guilty plea colloquy is not
deficient solely because the district court did not advise a defendant of
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rights established by subsequent judicial decisions or changes in the
law.” Id. at 969.
United States v. Clark, 435 F.3d 1100 (9th Cir. 2006)
QUESTION: “[W]hether Congress exceeded its authority ‘to
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations,’ U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 8, cl. 3,
in enacting a statute that makes it a felony for any U.S. citizen who
travels in ‘foreign commerce,’ i.e. to a foreign country, to then engage in
an illegal commercial sex act with a minor.” Id. at 1101.
ANALYSIS: The court first noted that only a plain showing that
Congress had exceeded its constitutional authority would suffice to
invalidate the law. Id. at 1109 (citing United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S.
598, 607 (2000)). The court held that the showing was not made by the
defendant in this case. Id. The court noted that Congress’s power to
regulate commerce between nations is not as well defined as its domestic
powers. Id. at 1112. Congress’s power for regulating commerce between
nations, the court held, is sweeping and not subject to restrictions that
may be put on the power domestically. Id. at 1113. Using the rational
basis test, the court analyzed the statute and determined that because it
targeted commercial sex, it was constitutional. Id. at 1115.
CONCLUSION: Congress was within its authority under the Foreign
Commerce Clause to prohibit U.S. citizens from traveling in foreign
commerce to engage in illegal commercial sex acts with minors. Id. at
1117.
United States v. Scott, 424 F.3d 888 (9th Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: “[W]hether police may conduct a search based on less
than probable cause of an individual released while awaiting trial.” Id. at
888.
ANALYSIS: In determining whether to grant the defendant’s motion
to suppress evidence obtained by officers while released on
recognizance, the court carefully conducted a two-step inquiry into
whether: 1) “a drug test and search of the [defendant]’s house were valid
because the [defendant] consented to them as a condition of his release”;
and 2) “the search in question (taking the fact of consent into account)
was reasonable.” Id. at 890-893. The court pointed out that “one who has
been released on pretrial bail does not lose his or her Fourth Amendment
right to be free of unreasonable searches,” nor do they waive these rights
by consenting to searches as a condition of such release. Id. at 893.
Second, although “Fourth Amendment reasonableness” standards of
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probable cause may be relaxed “when ‘special needs, beyond the normal
need for law enforcement,’ make an insistence on the otherwise
applicable level of suspicion impracticable,” the court concluded that
protecting the community was not a special needs exception as crime
prevention was a quintessential law enforcement purpose. Id. at 893
(citing Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987)). Furthermore, the
court found that the connection between the drug test and the harm to be
avoided, nonappearance in court, was not obvious. Id. at 895. The court
noted that the issue before the court was not only one of first impression
in the 9th Circuit, but also “one of first impression in any federal circuit
and the vast majority of state courts.” Id. at 889.
CONCLUSION: The court “affirm[ed] the district court’s order
granting the [defendant]’s motion to suppress,” holding that warrantless
searches, including drug testing, imposed as a condition of pretrial
release, required a showing of probable cause, despite defendant’s
prerelease consent.” Id. at 898.
Kelava v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2006)
QUESTION: Whether it is impermissible “to deny [an alien
petitioner] eligibility for previously available discretionary relief” of a
“waiver of inadmissibility or cancellation of removal for having engaged
in terrorist activity” retroactively within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. §
1227(a)(4)(B) and 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii)(II). Id. at 1121.
ANALYSIS: In 1978, petitioner, an alien from Croatia, and another
man “entered the West German Consulate in Chicago, armed with
handguns, ropes and a phony bomb” and “seized several employees.” Id.
at 1122. “[I]nitially indicted and convicted in federal court of conspiracy
and kidnapping of foreign officials,” petitioner later pled guilty to
unarmed imprisonment of a foreign national on retrial and was
sentenced. Id. “Nearly 20 years later . . . the INS commenced removal
proceedings . . . pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii)” and 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(4)(B). Id. The Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) found
the alien removable for the terrorist activities and “precluded from
seeking a waiver of inadmissibility under former § 212(c) under the
Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c),
commonly referred to as a ‘§ 212(c) waiver.’” Id. In an issue of first
impression, the alien argued that it was “impermissibly retroactive to
deny him eligibility for previously available discretionary relief” (a §
212(c) waiver) because he was not convicted of engaging in a terrorist
activity but rather entered into a plea bargain. Id. at 1121. However, the
court reasoned that aliens “‘cannot plausibly claim that they would have
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acted any differently if they had known’ about the elimination of §
212(c) relief, even though the criminal act and conviction occurred
before the [Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility
Act of 1996 (“IIRIRA”)] amend[ed]” the statute. Id. at 1124. The alien
only had to have committed, not been convicted of, the terrorist act, and
it would be absurd for him to argue that he would not have committed
that act if he had known he would lose the possibility of obtaining §
212(c) relief. Thus, “there is no retroactive effect in applying the IIRIRA
elimination § 212(c) relief to [an alien], who quite clearly engaged in the
requisite terrorist activity prior to IIRIRA’s enactment.” Id. at 1126.
CONCLUSION: The court disagreed with petitioner, finding that it
was not impermissibly retroactive to deny [alien-petitioner] eligibility for
a § 212(c) waiver from removal when the alien “had engaged in terrorist
activity following his admission to the United States” despite it being
prior to the statute’s amendment. Id. at 1123.
Mancebo v. Adams, 435 F.3d 977 (9th Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: “[W]hether the failure to prevent the introduction of
improper polygraph evidence can serve as grounds for reversing a
conviction pursuant to AEDPA.” Id. at 979.
ANALYSIS: “Mancebo argues that he was denied his right to
effective counsel at his original trial because his counsel failed to object
to the state’s introduction of the recording of a conversation Mancebo
had with police, during which Mancebo indicated his desire not to take a
polygraph examination.” Id. The court first noted that “[p]ursuant to the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), we
can only overturn Mancebo’s conviction if the state court decision
affirming his conviction was ‘an unreasonable application of . . . clearly
established Federal law.’” Id. at 978. The court then noted that “for an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim to succeed, a party must
demonstrate that the performance of his or her attorney ‘fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness’ and that ‘there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different.’” Id. at 979 (quoting Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1994)). The court held that it “need not
determine whether counsel’s performance was deficient before
examining the prejudice suffered.” Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at
697).
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that “[i]n addition to the small
role the polygraph evidence played in the trial, there is sufficient other
evidence supporting Mancebo’s conviction to preclude us from finding
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‘there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’” Id. at
980 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).
McSherry v. City of Long Beach, 423 F.3d 1015 (9th Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: Whether the grant of a motion for judgment as matter
of law under FED. R. CIV. P. 50 “at the outset of trial, prior to the
presentation of any evidence, is appropriate.” Id. at 1019.
ANALYSIS: FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a) “presumes that a jury trial has
begun, and that the nonmoving party ‘has been fully heard’ on the issue
prior to the court’s ruling.” Id. Further, Rule 50(a)(2) provides that
motions for judgment as a matter of law may be made at any time before
submission of the case to the jury. However, the argument that a “Rule
50 motion may be made at, literally, ‘any time’ once a trial has
commenced, regardless of the state of evidence admitted” is erroneous.
Id. “Nothing about the language or structure of the provisions suggests
that Rule 50(a)(2) has a force independent of Rule 50(a)(1). Reading the
two provisions together, it is apparent that Rule 50(a)(1) sets forth the
standards under which a court may grant judgment as a matter of law,
while Rule 50(a)(2) explains when a party may make a motion.” Id.
Furthermore, Rule 50(a)(2) is “not intended as an alternative mechanism
for obtaining summary judgment, as the advisory committee notes make
clear.” Id. at 1020.
CONCLUSION: The court ruled that the trial judge erred in granting
judgment as a matter of law before taking evidence. Id. Under Rule 50,
the nonmoving party has a right to be fully heard on the issue before the
grant of the motion. Id. at 1019. The court concluded “this use of Rule 50
is not supported by the language of the rule, the advisory committee’s
notes, or caselaw governing the proper use of Rule 50.” Id.
TENTH CIRCUIT
Am. Soda v. U.S. Filter Wastewater Group, 428 F.3d 921 (10th Cir.
2005)
QUESTION: “Whether the U.S. district courts are courts of the
various states in which they are located.” Id. at 925.
ANALYSIS: “Other courts have described the issue as a question of
sovereignty versus geography.” Id. at 925. “If the contract language
refers to the state courts to the exclusion of the federal courts, it is a term
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of sovereignty.” Id. Otherwise, if the contract language encompasses
particular state courts and the federal court sitting within that particular
state, then “it is a term of geography.” Id.
CONCLUSION: The court of appeals concluded that “the forum
selection clause in the parties’ agreement designates the Colorado state
court system as the forum for resolution of disputes arising out of the
contract, and does not include the federal district court.” Id. at 926.
In re Joelson, 427 F.3d 700 (10th Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: Whether the phrase “respecting the debtor’s financial
condition” in 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) & (B) “should be interpreted
broadly, to include all oral communications that reflect on the extent of
any of [the debtor’s] assets, liabilities, and income,” or strictly, “to
include only information as to [the debtor’s] overall financial health.” Id.
at 705-06.
ANALYSIS: Although the Supreme Court has not directly addressed
this issue, the decision in Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59 (1995), “lends some
support to the notion that a statement ‘respecting the debtor’s . . .
financial condition’ must relate to a debtor’s overall financial health.” Id.
at 710. Additionally, the court reasoned that a strict reading is “consistent
with the text and structure of the Bankruptcy Code, Congress’s intent as
expressed in the legislative history of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) and (B),
and case law.” Id. at 706.
CONCLUSION: The 10th Circuit held that the phrase “respecting the
debtor’s financial condition” in 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) & (B) “should
be interpreted strictly to include only information as to [the debtor’s]
overall financial health.” Id. at 709.
Mactec, Inc. v. Gorelick, 427 F.3d 821 (10th Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: Whether “a non-appealability clause in an arbitration
agreement that forecloses judicial review of an arbitration award beyond
the district court level is enforceable.” Id. at 824.
ANALYSIS: In this case, the parties included a clause in their
contract providing for arbitration of any disputed contractual term and
that such arbitration would be final once confirmed by the district court.
Id. at 823. A dispute arose, the parties submitted it to arbitration, the
arbitrator found in the defendant’s favor and the plaintiff sought judicial
review of the arbitrator’s decision. Id. at 823-24. The court reviewed its
prior holdings concerning the enforceability of contractual restrictions
limiting judicial review of arbitration awards. Id. at 828-30.
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CONCLUSION: The court held that “contractual provisions limiting
the right to appeal from a district court’s judgment confirming or
vacating an arbitration award are permissible, so long as the intent to do
so is clear and unequivocal.” Id. at 830.
Paper, Allied-Indus., Chem. And Energy Workers Int’l Union v. Cont’l
Carbon Co., 428 F.3d 1285 (10th Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: What is the correct standard for determining “whether
particular state’s laws are comparable to 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)” for
purposes of determining whether federal action is barred under the Clean
Water Act (“CWA”), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (2000), and if so, whether the
jurisdictional bar applies to both civil penalties and equitable relief. Id. at
1288-89.
ANALYSIS: The court found that the “[CWA] calls for something
less than a rigorous comparability standard.” Id. at 1293. Hence, the 10th
Circuit followed the 11th Circuit’s “rough comparability” approach in
determining whether a state law is comparable to the CWA. Id. The
“rough comparability” approach examines “the three categories of
provisions” found within 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g), which includes “penalty
assessment, public participation, and judicial review.” Id. at 1294.
Therefore, any court using the “rough comparability” approach “engaged
in an independent analysis for each category of state-law provisions.” Id.
If one category “is found to be lacking,” then the suit cannot be
precluded. Id.
CONCLUSION: The 10th Circuit ruled “that in order to satisfy
U.S.C. § 1319(g)(6)(A)(ii), three categories of state law provisionspenalty-assessment, public participation and judicial review must be
roughly comparable to the corresponding categories of federal
provisions.” Id. at 1288. In addition, the jurisdictional bar found under
this section of the statute only applies to civil penalty claims. Id. at 1289.
Peoples v. CCA Detention Ctrs., 422 F.3d 1090 (10th Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: “[W]hether the existence of a state-law cause of action
for damages, standing alone, precludes a Bivens claim against an
employee of a privately operated prison.” Id. at 1100.
ANALYSIS: Although considered by three district courts, no court of
appeals has ruled on the matter. Id. The court held that under state law
the employees had a duty to protect the detainee from known harm, and
the detainee thus had a state tort remedy for violation of that duty. Id.
State law also provided a civil remedy for eavesdropping or breach of
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privacy; therefore, implying a federal cause of action was therefore
unwarranted. Id. Moreover, the court continued, the detainee’s
segregation was based solely on the needs of the prison, was not
punitive, and the detainee was provided with reasonable access to legal
materials. Id. at 1103.
CONCLUSION: Ultimately, the court affirmed the district court in
holding that under Malesko, a Bivens claim should not be implied when
an alternative cause of action arising under either state or federal law
exists. Id. Thus, “federal prisoners have no implied right of action for
damages against an employee of a privately operated prison under
contract with the United States Marshals Service when state or federal
law affords the prisoner an alternative cause of action for damages for
the alleged injury.” Id. at 1108.
Norton v. Marietta, Oklahoma, 432 F.3d 1145 (10th Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: Whether a plaintiff “who seeks to bring suit about
prison life after he has been released and is no longer a prisoner [must]
satisfy the [Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”)] before bringing
suit.” Id. at 1151.
ANALYSIS: Because the PLRA requires “a prisoner [to] exhaust all
available administrative remedies before bringing suit,” the court first
looked to the PLRA’s definition of “prisoner.” Id. at 1149 (emphasis
added). The PLRA defines “prisoner” as “any person incarcerated or
detained in any facility who is accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, or
adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms and
conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary
program.” Id. at 1150. Siding with other circuits who “have unanimously
held that it is the plaintiff’s status at the time he files suit that determines
whether [the PLRA] exhaustion provision applies,” the court found that
the exhaustion provision does not apply to a plaintiff who is not a
prisoner. Id. at 1150.
CONCLUSION: The 10th Circuit, siding with its sister circuits,
found the “statutory language [to be] plain and unambiguous [and]
[t]herefore plaintiff, who was not a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or
other correctional facility when he brought suit, did not have to exhaust
his administrative remedies first.” Id.
United States v. Morales-Chaires, 430 F.3d 1124 (10th Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: Whether “the sentencing factors specified in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) support a sentence below the otherwise applicable Guideline
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range,” post-Booker, because of the “disparities between sentences
imposed in districts where a ‘fast-track’ program exists for aliens
accused of illegal reentry and in districts, like Colorado, where no such
‘fast-track’ program exists.” Id. at 1127.
ANALYSIS: The court discussed so-called “fast track” sentencing
programs in certain states where illegal immigrants would plead guilty
and waive certain appeals in exchange for lighter sentences, and the fact
that defendant was not subject to a fast-track proceeding in Colorado. Id.
at 1127. It noted that since the Federal Sentencing Guidelines were
changed by the Booker decision, federal courts had not developed a
consistent standard for reviewing the fast-track program. Id. at 1130. The
1st Circuit had suggested that downward departures were not necessary,
while several district courts had held that courts may use discretion to
minimize sentencing disparities. Id.
CONCLUSION: The court upheld defendant’s conviction, but did not
make a determination as to the propriety of the fast-track sentencing
programs. Id. at 1131. The court held that defendant’s sentence was
appropriate under conditions laid out in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6). Id.
Robbins v. Wilkie, 433 F.3d 755 (10th Cir. 2006)
QUESTION: Whether a party’s “failure to appeal the district court’s
order denying dismissal on qualified immunity precludes [the party]
from appealing an order denying summary judgment on the same
qualified immunity issues.” Id. at 762.
ANALYSIS: “Although this issue is one of first impression in this
circuit, the Supreme Court and several other circuits have addressed the
issue.” Id. In Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299 (1996), the Court
concluded that “resolution of the immunity question may ‘require more
than one judiciously timed appeal.’” Id. (citing Behrens, 516 U.S. at
309). It reasoned “that a defendant should be permitted to raise the
qualified immunity defense at successive stages of litigation because
different legal factors are relevant at various stages.” Id. (citing Behrens,
516 U.S. at 309). The 3rd Circuit ruled that “a defendant’s failure to
appeal an order denying dismissal on qualified immunity does not
preclude him from appealing a subsequent denial of the same legal
arguments in a motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity.”
Id. (citing Grant v. City of Pittsburgh, 98 F.3d 116, 120-21 (3d Cir.
1996)). The 9th Circuit went further and “assert[ed] jurisdiction over an
appeal of an order denying a second motion for summary judgment after
defendant failed to appeal the denial of his first summary judgment
motion.” Id. (citing Knox v. Southwest Airlines, 124 F.3d 1103, 1105-06
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(9th Cir. 1997)). Thus, “after Behrens, no circuit has held that an
appellate court lacks jurisdiction over denial of a motion for summary
judgment when the motion raises the same legal arguments as a prior
unappealed motion to dismiss but relies on evidence developed during
discovery. Similarly, [this court] decline[s] to adopt such a rule.” Id. at
763.
CONCLUSION: The court held that in the present case,
“[d]efendants’ failure to appeal the district court’s denial of dismissal on
qualified immunity does not divest this court of jurisdiction to consider
Defendants’ current appeal because Defendants’ summary judgment
motion relies in part on evidence developed during discovery.” Id. at
764.
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
United States v. Howell, 425 F.3d 971 (11th Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: Whether a convicted felon is entitled to the actual or
constructive return of his or her firearms under FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e).
ANALYSIS: “‘Rule 41(e) compels a district court to afford . . .
persons an opportunity to submit evidence in order to demonstrate that
they are lawfully entitled to the challenged property . . . . When it is
apparent that the person seeking a return of the property is not lawfully
entitled to own or possess the property, the district court need not hold an
evidentiary hearing. Federal law prohibits convicted felons from
possessing guns. Based upon [defendant’s] status as a convicted felon,
the district court could properly conclude without receiving evidence that
[the defendant] is not entitled to a return of firearms.’” Id. at 976
(quoting United States v. Felici, 208 F.3d 667, 670 (8th Cir. 2000)).
According to the 11th Circuit, a convicted felon could not use Rule 41(e)
to make a request of constructive return of firearms. Id. at 977.
Constructive return would either be accomplished through the sale of
those firearms with the proceeds going to the convicted felon or by
allowing a third party to hold the weapons in trust for the felon. Id. The
11th Circuit noted that “‘[f]ederal law prohibits convicted felons from
possessing guns . . . . [The defendant] is also not entitled to have the
firearms held in trust for him by a third party. Such a request suggests
constructive possession. Any firearm possession, actual or constructive,
by a convicted felon is prohibited by law.’” Id. (quoting Felici, 208 F.3d
at 670)).

2006]

First Impressions

501

CONCLUSION: A convicted felon cannot successfully use Rule
41(e) to force a court to actually or constructively return firearms to the
felon’s possession.
Jackson v. Cintas Corp., 425 F.3d 1313 (11th Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: “[W]hether an order compelling arbitration and
dismissing a complaint, but retaining jurisdiction over a motion for
sanctions, is a final and appealable decision.” Id. at 1315.
ANALYSIS: The court commenced its analysis with a thorough
review of the statute: “The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) [9 U.S.C. §
16(a)(3)] allows an immediate appeal from any ‘final decision with
respect to arbitration.’” Id. at 1316. A decision is final when the entire
case is completed and no part remains before the court. Id. In this case,
the district court dismissed the case, but retained jurisdiction over the
motion for sanctions. Id. The 11th Circuit, drawing on prior precedent,
viewed the motion for sanctions as a collateral issue. Id.
CONCLUSION: “Because the dismissal disposes of the entire case
on the merits and the motion for sanctions raises only a collateral issue,
[the court] conclude[d] that the dismissal [was] a final and appealable
order.” Id. at 1315.
Tinker v. Beasley, 429 F.3d 1324 (11th Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: Whether a “coercive interrogation that does not result
in a confession or other self-incrimination may constitute a violation of
substantive due process rights.” Id. at 1327.
ANALYSIS: Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Miller v.
Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 109 (1985), which held that courts must condemn
interrogation techniques that “are so offensive to a civilized system of
justice,” the 11th Circuit ruled that “the officers were justified in
believing they had the right person in custody at the time of the
interrogation.” Id. at 1329. Therefore, the officers’ conduct was not “so
offensive” to the justice system as to warrant a due process violation. Id.
CONCLUSION: The court held that “only the most egregious official
conduct” during an interrogation will be considered a due process
violation. Id. at 1328.
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Peebles v. Merrill Lynch, Inc., 431 F.3d 1320 (11th Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: Whether the amount in controversy requirement for
diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) is controlled by the
amount claimed in an original action that went to arbitration, or by the
amount of an arbitration award. Id. at 1325.
ANALYSIS: The maximum amount sought by the plaintiff in this
case was the “vacatur of a zero dollar arbitration award and a new
arbitration hearing at which he could urge his argument that he was
entitled to up to $2,000,000 in damages.” Id. at 1325-26.
CONCLUSION: “A federal court has subject matter jurisdiction
where a party seeking to vacate an arbitration award hearing at which he
will demand a sum which exceeds the amount in controversy for
diversity jurisdiction purposes.” Id. at 1325.
United States v. Williams, 425 F.3d 987 (11th Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: Whether, under the 1991 version of 18 U.S.C. §
3583(e)(3), the statutory caps apply to each revocation of supervised
release or to the aggregate of the sentences imposed on multiple
revocations of supervised release.” Id. at 988.
ANALYSIS: Section 3583(e)(3) allows a court to require a felon on
supervised release to serve his remaining time back in jail if that felon
violates any of the provisions of the supervised release. Id. at 988. The
statute also provides a method for granting credits for time served on
supervised release. Id. First, the court looked to the plain meaning of the
statute to determine its meaning; however, in this case, the court found
that the statute was ambiguous. Id. at 989. The 11th Circuit then looked
to the legislative history of the statute to find support for the aggregation
argument. Id. The court further noted that six other circuits have
addressed the issue and found that the aggregation method should be
applied. Id.
CONCLUSION: “Section 3583(e)(3)’s statutory maximums apply in
the aggregate.” Id. at 990.
Klay v. All Defendants, et al., 425 F.3d 977 (11th Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: “Whether the requirement of reasonable compensation
in FED. R. CIV. P. 45(c)(3)(B) obliges a party that has compelled, by
subpoena, the production of confidential data to pay a license fee for the
data, even though the district court, by protective order, limited the use
of the data to litigation purposes, avoided any diminution of the value of
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the data, and required the payment of the production costs of the data.”
Id. at 980.
ANALYSIS: First, the 11th Circuit stated that district courts have
broad discretion in managing pretrial discovery and allocation of costs;
therefore, it only reviewed the district court’s interpretation of Rule
45(c)(3)(B). Id. at 982. The court began its analysis by looking to the text
of Rule 45(c)(3)(B) to determine if the enforcement of a subpoena for
confidential data requires the payment of reasonable compensation. Id.
The court looked to the construction of the statute itself to determine that
the reasonable compensation standard was intended to apply to a
subpoena that requires disclosure of certain types of commercial
information. Id. at 983. The 11th Circuit then found that reasonable
compensation is required for any losses caused by the production of
confidential material. Id. However, the court noted that reasonable
compensation is a broad and flexible term; therefore, it does not
necessarily apply in every possible situation. Id. at 984. The court then
found that the district court did not abuse its discretion since the
company suffered no harm or loss by producing the information. Id. at
986.
CONCLUSION: The district court did not abuse its discretion when it
only required payment of production costs, because the property in
question did not diminish in value. Id. at 980.
United States v. Rahim, 431 F.3d 753 (11th Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: Whether 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) “permit[s] two convictions
for the use of a firearm in the course of a crime of violence when the
underlying offenses were part of a single course of conduct . . . [and] if
the statute allows two convictions for a single course of conduct,
[whether it is] unconstitutional under the Double Jeopardy Clause of the
Fifth Amendment.” Id. at 757.
ANALYSIS: The court reasoned that “[n]othing in the language of
section 924(c)” suggests that the statute prohibits two convictions simply
because the “predicate crimes of violence arise from the same course of
conduct.” Id. Rather, “section 924(c) makes it a crime to use, carry, or
possess a firearm ‘during and in relation to any crime of violence . . . .’”
Id. (quoting § 924(c)(1)(A) (2000)). Finally, the court noted that “[t]his
interpretation is consistent with our precedent and the decision of every
other circuit to address the issue on similar facts.” Id. As to the issue of
double jeopardy, the court reasoned that “[m]ultiple convictions for the
same course of conduct violate the Double Jeopardy Clause unless each
of the two offenses charged ‘requires proof of an additional fact which
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the other does not.’” Id. at 758 (quoting Blockburger v. United States,
284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932)). In this case, each conviction “required proof
of an element that the other did not.” Id.
CONCLUSION: The court held that § 924(c) permits two convictions
arising from the same course of conduct, and such convictions are not
prohibited by the Double Jeopardy Clause so long as each conviction
“required proof of an element that the other did not.” Id.
United States v. Grant, 431 F.3d 760 (11th Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: In determining intended loss under United States
Sentencing Guidelines § 2B1.1, “whether a district court clearly errs by
including the full face value of photocopied corporate checks in its
calculation.” Id. at 762.
ANALYSIS: The court began by noting that a district court must
make a reasonable estimate of the intended loss. Id. Next, the court noted
that other circuits, including the 3rd and 10th Circuits, have concluded
that a “district court does not clearly err when it uses the full face value
of a check to calculate intended loss.” Id. Finally, the court observed that
in the context of stolen credit cards, the 11th Circuit previously
determined that “‘a district court does not err in determining the amount
of the intended loss as the total line of credit to which Defendant could
have access, especially when Defendant presents no evidence that he did
not intend to utilize all of the credit available on the cards.’” Id. at 764
(quoting United States v. Manoocher Nosrati Shamloo, 255 F.3d 1290,
1291 (11th Cir. 2001)).
CONCLUSION: The 11th Circuit held that “when an individual
possesses a stolen check, or a photocopy of a stolen check, for the
purpose of counterfeiting, the district court does not clearly err when it
uses the full face value of the stolen check in making a reasonable
calculation of the intended loss.” Id. at 765.
United States v. Williams, 431 F.3d 767 (11th Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: The court examined “the meaning of the word ‘any’ as
it is used in United States Sentencing Guideline § 2K2.1(c)(1).” Id. at
768.
ANALYSIS: The court rejected defendant’s argument that the word
“any” is limited to the “firearms that he was charged with possessing.”
Id. at 769. The court reasoned that where the guidelines reference the
firearm in possession, they require that “the firearm had to be the one
which was charged in the violation.” Id. The court noted that the word
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“any” is “general and nonspecific,” and recognized that the guidelines
“evince an understanding of this distinction.” Id. Finally, the court
observed that the 8th and 10th Circuits also hold that “‘any firearm’ truly
means any firearm.” Id. at 770.
CONCLUSION: The court found that the word “any” includes “any
firearm that is used in connection with the commission of another
offense which is within the relevant conduct of the charged offense.” Id.
at 768.
Bennett v. Hendrix, 423 F.3d 1247 (11th Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: What is the “precise test for determining whether the
defendants’ actions violated the plaintiffs’ rights against retaliation.” Id.
at 1250.
ANALYSIS: In this civil rights case, the court looked to the law
applied in other circuits and found a common three-prong test. Id. The
plaintiff first must establish that his act or speech was constitutionally
protected; second, that the defendant’s retaliatory action adversely
affected the protected act or speech; and third, that a causal connection
exists between the retaliatory conduct and the adverse affect it had on
speech. Id. The court was concerned only with which standard to apply
to the second prong and looked to other circuits, the majority of which
utilized an objective “ordinary firmness” test. Id. at 1250-51. The court
found the adoption of an objective test by the majority of other circuits to
be persuasive and sided with their reasoning that “[a]n objective standard
provides notice to government officials of when their retaliatory actions
violate a plaintiff’s First Amendment rights” whereas a subjective
standard would lead to inconsistent rulings on liability despite identical
conduct. Id. at 1250. Finally, the court held that the objective standard is
consistent with statements from other 11th Circuit cases. Id. at 1254.
CONCLUSION: The court ultimately utilized an objective “ordinary
firmness” test to determine whether defendants’ actions violated
plaintiffs’ rights against retaliation. Id. at 1251.
Watson v. Drummon Co., 436 F.3d 1310 (11th Cir 2006)
QUESTION: “Whether and under what circumstances a union can
qualify as an employer for purposes of the EPPA (“Employee Polygraph
Protection Act”).” Id. at 1316.
ANALYSIS: In considering this question, the 11th Circuit adopts the
“economic reality test,” which defines “employer” as the “level of
control the union yielded over the employer as per the economic realities
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of their relationship.” Id. The Court reasoned that “given the substantial
similarities between the definition of “employer in the EEPA and in the
FMLA and FLSA, we find that the economic reality test appropriate here
as well.” Id. In addition, the court pointed to del Canto v. ITT Sheraton
Corp., 865 F. Supp. 927, 932-33 (D.D.C. 1994), and noted that the Court
used the “economic reality test” to answer this precise question.
CONCLUSION: “In this case there is no evidence that the Union
exerted control of the company to be considered an ‘employer.’” Id. at
1316. “The record indicates that the Union was acting in the interests of
its members . . . and not in the interest of the company.” Id. The
company denied the Union’s request for the reinstatement of its
members. Id. The Union’s suggestion for polygraph tests was to provide
for a quick way for the employees to clear their names and regain their
jobs, not to benefit the employer. Id.
Barnes v. United States, 437 F.3d 1074 (11th Cir. 2006)
QUESTION: Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996, whether “a timely motion seeking a new trial under FED. R.
CRIM. P. 33 serves to render a judgment of conviction as not final for
purposes of the running of the one-year statute of limitations under 28
U.S.C. § 2255.” Id. at 1078 (quoting Johnson v. United States, 246 F.3d
655, 657 (6th Cir. 2001)).
ANALYSIS: The 1st, 4th, and 6th Circuits had held that a Rule 33
filing did not extend the statute of limitations. Id. at 1078-79. A
“petitioner was free to file his § 2255 [motion to vacate] without fear that
it would be dismissed for failing to exhaust post-conviction remedies.”
Id. at 1079. The 1st Circuit had determined that the “one-year statute of
limitations would sometimes require a prisoner to initiate duplicative
proceedings, [but the] district courts were well equipped to alleviate the
problem through consolidation of motions for collateral relief.” Id.
CONCLUSION: Defendant’s “§ 2255 motion, filed nearly two years
after the Supreme Court denied him certiorari, was untimely,” and a
Rule 33 filing “had no effect on when his conviction became ‘final.’” Id.
United States v. Cantellano, 430 F.3d 1142 (11th Cir. 2005)
QUESTION: There are three issues of first impression presented for
the court: (1) “whether, under Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36
(2004), a warrant of deportation is testimonial evidence subject to
confrontation at trial; (2) whether, under Crawford, a defendant has a
right to confrontation at sentencing; and (3) whether, under Shepard v.
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United States, 125 S. Ct. 1254 (2005), a sentencing court may use
documents other than court records to identify a defendant with a
conviction.” Id. at 1143.
ANALYSIS: As to the first issue, “[w]e are persuaded that a warrant
of deportation does not implicate adversarial concerns in the same way
or to the same degree as testimonial evidence. A warrant of deportation
is recorded routinely and not in preparation for a criminal trial.” Id. at
1145. As to the right to confrontation at sentencing, the court ruled that
“[w]e also have held recently that the admission of hearsay testimony at
a sentencing hearing ‘cannot be plain error.’” Id. at 1146 (quoting United
States v. Quan Chau, 426 F.2d 1227, 1254-55 (11th Cir. 1982)). “The
Supreme Court, in distinguishing pre-trial rights, explicitly has said that
‘the right to confrontation is a trial right.’” Id. (quoting Pennsylvania v.
Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 52 (1987)). “Shepard [ ] restrict[s] only the sources
a sentencing court may consider to determine the character of a prior
conviction as a violent felony.” Id. at 1146
CONCLUSION: “Because a warrant of deportation does not raise the
concerns regarding testimonial evidence stated in Crawford, we conclude
that a warrant of deportation is non-testimonial and therefore is not
subject to confrontation.” Id. at 1145. The court joined the 1st, 2nd, 5th,
6th, 7th, 8th, and 10th Circuits and concluded, “[w]e see no reason to
extend Crawford to sentencing proceedings. The right to confrontation is
not a sentencing right.” Id. at 1146. “The fact of a prior conviction
clearly may be found by the district court.” Id. at 1147.

